Decades ago, when I learned to fly, it was well-known that a commercial co-pilot/first officer was allowed to occupy the right seat of a transport airplane only if they’d proven themselves subservient enough to understand that the guy in the left seat was perfectly capable of handling the airplane all by himself.
Captains believed the FO was only there to check a regulatory box. If the co-pilot was lucky, the captain might let them work the radios and help with a few navigational duties, but the phrase “Gear up and Shut up” was considered a normal cockpit environment.
Questions, opinions, or ideas from the right seat were not welcomed. If the FO had learned anything, it would have been by accident. And there were plenty of accidents; a few airliner crashes a month, while tragic, were not unheard of.
In 1979, a pivotal moment in aviation history occurred when NASA psychologist John Lauber’s research team revealed that human error was the cause of nearly 75 percent of commercial aviation accidents. This finding highlighted the role of communication, decision-making, and leadership in cockpit behavior and the resulting accidents. It also led to the birth of cockpit resource management (CRM); a process designed to train crews to utilize all the flight deck’s human resources effectively. CRM became a leading force in preventing ‘pilot error’ and reducing accidents. Pilots actually began talking with each other before making any life-or-death decisions. Later, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) combined with CRM (now called crew resource management) led to a global reduction of air carrier accidents. There hasn’t been a fatal air carrier accident in the US since 2009.
Despite the incredible improvements in commercial aviation safety, the same cannot be said for general aviation. The fatal accident statistics remain alarming despite the dedicated efforts and safety enhancements from groups like the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC). Nearly 50 years after NASA’s groundbreaking research, most accidents in non-airliner flights are still attributed to pilot error, indicating that much work is yet to be done in this sector.
Hawker Accident at Aspen
On February 21, 2022, the crew and four passengers aboard a Hawker 800 nearly lost their lives when the twin-engine business jet sailed off the end of Runway 33 into soft snow at Aspen Pitkin County Airport (ASE), Colorado, during its takeoff run. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage.
Unique to this accident was the wind that morning. “The ATIS indicated the wind was from 170° at 18 knots and gusting to 30 knots,” according to the NTSB’s final report. That represented nearly a direct tailwind at takeoff. The Hawker certification limits the aircraft to a tailwind component of no more than 10 knots for landing or takeoff.
I took a special interest in this accident because I’ve flown in and out of ASE many times and also flew the Hawker 800. [Read more…] about Flight Planning Demands a Dose of Common Sense