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Making the Brazilian ATR-72 Spin
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Note: This story was corrected on August 10th at 10:23 am, thanks to the help of a sharp-eyed reader.
Making an ATR-72 Spin
I wasn’t in Brazil on Friday afternoon, but I saw the post on Twitter or X (or whatever you call it) showing a Brazil ATR-72, Voepass Airlines flight 2283, rotating in a spin as it plunged to the ground near Sao Paulo from its 17,000-foot cruising altitude. All 61 people aboard perished in the ensuing crash and fire. A timeline from FlightRadar 24 indicates that the fall only lasted about a minute, so the aircraft was clearly out of control. Industry research shows Loss of Control in Flight (LOCI) continues to be responsible for more fatalities worldwide than any other kind of aircraft accident.
The big question is why the crew lost control of this airplane. The ADS-B data from FlightRadar 24 does offer a couple of possible clues. The ATR’s speed declined during the descent rather than increased, which means the aircraft’s wing was probably stalled. The ATR’s airfoil had exceeded its critical angle of attack and lacked sufficient lift to remain airborne. Add to this the rotation observed, and the only answer is a spin.
Can a Large Airplane Spin?
The simple answer is yes. If you induce rotation to almost any aircraft while the wing is stalled, it can spin, even an aircraft as large as the ATR-72. By the way, the largest of the ATR models, the 600, weighs nearly 51,000 pounds.
Of course, investigators will ask why the ATR’s wing was stalled. It could have been related to a failed engine or ice on the wings or tailplane. (more…)
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How the FAA Let Remote Tower Technology Slip Right Through Its Fingers
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In June 2023, the FAA published a 167-page document outlining the agency’s desire to replace dozens of 40-year-old airport control towers with new environmentally friendly brick-and-mortar structures. These towers are, of course, where hundreds of air traffic controllers ply their trade … ensuring the aircraft within their local airspace are safely separated from each other during landing and takeoff.
The FAA’s report was part of President Biden’s Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act enacted on November 15, 2021. That bill set aside a whopping $25 billion spread across five years to cover the cost of replacing those aging towers. The agency said it considered a number of alternatives about how to spend that $5 billion each year, rather than on brick and mortar buildings.
One alternative addressed only briefly before rejecting it was a relatively new concept called a Remote Tower, originally created by Saab in Europe in partnership with the Virginia-based VSATSLab Inc. The European technology giant has been successfully running Remote Towers in place of the traditional buildings in Europe for almost 10 years. One of Saab’s more well-known Remote Tower sites is at London City Airport. London also plans to create a virtual backup ATC facility at London Heathrow, the busiest airport in Europe.
A remote tower and its associated technology replace the traditional 60-70 foot glass domed control tower building you might see at your local airport, but it doesn’t eliminate any human air traffic controllers or their roles in keeping aircraft separated.
Max Trescott photo Inside a Remote Tower Operation
In place of a normal control tower building, the airport erects a small steel tower or even an 8-inch diameter pole perhaps 20-40 feet high, similar to a radio or cell phone tower. Dozens of high-definition cameras are attached to the new Remote Tower’s structure, each aimed at an arrival or departure path, as well as various ramps around the airport.
Using HD cameras, controllers can zoom in on any given point within the camera’s range, say an aircraft on final approach. The only way to accomplish that in a control tower today is if the controller picks up a pair of binoculars. The HD cameras also offer infrared capabilities to allow for better-than-human visuals, especially during bad weather or at night.
The next step in constructing a remote tower is locating the control room where the video feeds will terminate. Instead of the round glass room perched atop a standard control tower, imagine a semi-circular room located at ground level. Inside that room, the walls are lined with 14, 55-inch high-definition video screens hung next to each other with the wider portion of the screen running top to bottom.
After connecting the video feeds, the compression technology manages to consolidate 360 degrees of viewing area into a 220-degree spread across the video screens. That creates essentially the same view of the entire airport that a controller would normally see out the windows of the tower cab without the need to move their head more than 220 degrees. Another Remote Tower benefit is that each aircraft within visual range can be tagged with that aircraft’s tail number, just as it might if the controller were looking at a radar screen. (more…)
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Paper Brain & Thinking Beyond the Checklist
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In situations of information overload it’s easy to overlook or forget important things as the mind struggles to focus and make sense of it all. In the air, pilots rely on checklists and standardized procedures, and on the ground, as a reporter I rely on my notebook, a paper brain, if you will.
After any event of information overload, like EAA AirVenture Oshkosh, I review my notes and list key topics on the back cover. More important than making it easier to find information should I need it in the future, it’s a double check to ensure something hasn’t fallen into the cracks between short-term and long-term memory and the desire to share what I’ve learned with others.
A perfect example is the talk Airbus Test Pilot Terry Lutz gave at the Meet the Master Instructors Breakfast, held by the National Association of Flight Instructors. Standardized procedures and following checklists are good things, he told the flight instructors, but focusing on them exclusively, without thinking about the variables of a particular situation can be detrimental to the safe outcome of a flight.
He used US Airways Flight 1549 as an example. When geese turned the Airbus 320 into a glider, one of the first things Captain Sullenberger did was not on the checklist, Lutz said: he fired up the APU. My notes are sketchy on his technical explanation of why this was an excellent decision. It had something to do the effect of a dual engine failure on backup generators and how long the batteries last, but the point was clear: electricity is important to fly-by-wire airplanes, and the APU provides it.
Captain Sully’s next good decision also came from thinking beyond the checklist, Lutz said, which says to “fly green-dot speed, the best L over D.” Immediately realizing he’d not make an airport, he flew at a speed that shortened the distance flown but increased the time aloft, giving First Officer Jeff Skiles more time to run the checklist and attempt a restart.
What led to these good decisions, Lutz said, was the captain’s diverse aviation experience in many different airplanes from fighters and gliders to a variety of transport category people haulers. His takeaway message to the instructors was clear: all flight training, from that first lesson at a grass strip in the country to earning a type rating in Lutz’s current ride, the A380, is structured to give the greatest result for the lowest cost.
Standardization is one way to make training most cost efficient, but the downside is the loss of aeronautical diversity, he continued. If pilots only focus on one way to fly, the Airbus way, the Boeing way, the pick-an-airline-or-flight-school way, they have no other experience to draw on when needed, and that limits their ability to think–and fly–outside the box filled with expected or anticipated situations. — Scott Spangler
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Paper Brain & Thinking Beyond the Checklist
by
[sc name=”post_comments” ][/sc]
In situations of information overload it’s easy to overlook or forget important things as the mind struggles to focus and make sense of it all. In the air, pilots rely on checklists and standardized procedures, and on the ground, as a reporter I rely on my notebook, a paper brain, if you will.
After any event of information overload, like EAA AirVenture Oshkosh, I review my notes and list key topics on the back cover. More important than making it easier to find information should I need it in the future, it’s a double check to ensure something hasn’t fallen into the cracks between short-term and long-term memory and the desire to share what I’ve learned with others.
A perfect example is the talk Airbus Test Pilot Terry Lutz gave at the Meet the Master Instructors Breakfast, held by the National Association of Flight Instructors. Standardized procedures and following checklists are good things, he told the flight instructors, but focusing on them exclusively, without thinking about the variables of a particular situation can be detrimental to the safe outcome of a flight.
He used US Airways Flight 1549 as an example. When geese turned the Airbus 320 into a glider, one of the first things Captain Sullenberger did was not on the checklist, Lutz said: he fired up the APU. My notes are sketchy on his technical explanation of why this was an excellent decision. It had something to do the effect of a dual engine failure on backup generators and how long the batteries last, but the point was clear: electricity is important to fly-by-wire airplanes, and the APU provides it.
Captain Sully’s next good decision also came from thinking beyond the checklist, Lutz said, which says to “fly green-dot speed, the best L over D.” Immediately realizing he’d not make an airport, he flew at a speed that shortened the distance flown but increased the time aloft, giving First Officer Jeff Skiles more time to run the checklist and attempt a restart.
What led to these good decisions, Lutz said, was the captain’s diverse aviation experience in many different airplanes from fighters and gliders to a variety of transport category people haulers. His takeaway message to the instructors was clear: all flight training, from that first lesson at a grass strip in the country to earning a type rating in Lutz’s current ride, the A380, is structured to give the greatest result for the lowest cost.
Standardization is one way to make training most cost efficient, but the downside is the loss of aeronautical diversity, he continued. If pilots only focus on one way to fly, the Airbus way, the Boeing way, the pick-an-airline-or-flight-school way, they have no other experience to draw on when needed, and that limits their ability to think–and fly–outside the box filled with expected or anticipated situations. — Scott Spangler
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NTSB Needs to Re-Admit NATCA to Investigation
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In life, everyone makes mistakes.
Most of the time, that’s really a good thing though because it offers us a unique path to become better at what we do. Being human though, admitting we screwed something up is not always easy, it’s downright embarrassing in fact. In government, admitting someone said or did something wrong is not viewed as an opportunity to learn or even as a simple mistake. It is – and always has been – seen as a sign of weakness, a philosophy that seems even more contradictory in our nation today now that transparency is the new goal.
In the case of the NTSB update report on the midair collision over the Hudson River last week, the safety board simply screwed up by including four little words in their initial report that didn’t belong there … “including the accident helicopter.” Those words were simply not correct.
The inference was that the Teterboro Tower controller should have noticed the helicopter on radar and pointed him out to the PA-32 pilot.
As it turns out, the helicopter did not appear on the tower controller’s scope until after he had already turned the aircraft over to Newark approach. On Friday, the controller’s union – NATCA – took the unprecedented action of calling a news conference to clarify this error, something the NTSB was not at all happy about. The safety board said Monday that since NATCA had violated confidentiality rules and that they were being removed from the investigation.